From Ormuz to Kerosene: How Naval Blockade Transforms a Petroleum Crisis into a Global Transportation Crisis

The Hormuz Strait: Open, Closed, Open

On April 14, the U.S. naval blockade of Hormuz came into effect. On April 18, Iran seized two commercial vessels – then the strait partially reopened under high tension (see our analysis). Tehran retains control over the strait: it can close and reopen the passage at will, transforming a 33-kilometer-wide bottleneck into a negotiating tool.

According to the EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration), approximately 21 million barrels of oil transit daily through this strait – accounting for 21% of global consumption. Each day of closure removes the equivalent of Saudi production from the market. But the threat of a closure now suffices to disrupt markets: maritime insurance premiums for the Gulf have been multiplied by 10 (Financial Times, Al-Sharq/Qatar), and maritime freight costs rose 30% in April according to the Baltic Dry Index. A cargo redirected via the Cape of Good Hope adds approximately $500,000 and 14 days to the journey, according to Clarksons Research estimates.

The cumulative cost for Asian importing economies -- insurance premium, Cape of Good Hope detour, additional delay -- now exceeds the surcharge on the crude itself. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, which do not have strategic oil reserves and rely on spot imports, are the most exposed.

The European response: two missions, one same conclusion

On April 18, Paris and London announced a joint naval mission, operating independently of the American command -- the first since Suez in 1956 (see our analysis). Trump explicitly excluded NATO from the operation. On April 21, London hosted military planners from more than 30 countries for a two-day conference on a multinational mission to protect navigation in the Strait (source: The Guardian, April 21, 2026).