THE PRISM — WEEK 18

In W15-W16, US pressure on NATO focused on specific files: sanctions, burden-sharing, Iran posture. In W17, the Pentagon floated suspending Spain. In W18, on April 29, Trump explicitly threatened to pull US troops from Germany — the first time the physical presence of US forces in Europe is weaponized as diplomatic leverage. Politico-Pravda and Le Monde documented the 36,000-troop figure. Les Echos recall that in 2020, Trump had already demanded the return of 9,500 soldiers — the current threat covers a force four times larger and extends to Italy and Spain. On April 30, BFMTV and Germany's SWP flagged that a US colonel had simultaneously been appointed to a strategic post within the German army command — force reorganization continues even amid the withdrawal threats.

The narrative shift reflects a doctrinal change: US presence in Europe is no longer a defensive given but a transactional asset. For Berlin, the consequence is concrete: 2027 budget planning must now factor in a partial withdrawal, forcing trade-offs between conventional defense and modernization programs (F-35, Eurofighter). For London, Charles III's April 29 Congressional address — 'the alliance cannot rest on its laurels' — is explicitly aimed at counterbalancing the American narrative by mobilizing the residual moral authority of the monarchy.

On April 30, the UAE announced their OPEC exit — effective May 1, 2026 (BBC, Al Jazeera). Abu Dhabi joined the cartel in 1967, before the Emirati federation was even established in 1971. The membership duration (59 years) is the longest for any Arab state. The closest precedent is Qatar's 2020 withdrawal. American outlets (WSJ, Bloomberg) framed the exit as a diplomatic rupture. Arab outlets (Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, The National) emphasized the strategic dimension: the UAE produces 2.9 mb/d and exports primarily to Asia — a quota-based OPEC framework becomes a commercial brake, not a leverage.

The UAE exit consecrates the fragmentation of the oil cartel. For Beijing and New Delhi, the leading Asian customers, the shift to bilateral deals is a win: they gain pricing flexibility and reduce exposure to Saudi quotas. For Riyadh, it is the loss of a coordination ally — Saudi Arabia stands alone as the price-discipline guardian. For Washington, the signal is ambivalent: a less coordinated Gulf eases American pressure but also reduces the capacity to stabilize prices during crises. The exit comes at the exact moment when Hormuz remains tense — the UAE choose commercial autonomy at the peak of regional tension.

On April 26, the DOJ dropped the case against Jerome Powell. On April 30, the Senate Banking Committee confirmed Kevin Warsh by a 13-11 vote — the first fully partisan vote on a Fed chair in the committee's history (Fortune, CNBC). Powell remains on the Board until May 15. The policy rate stays at 3.6%. Loretta Mester, former Cleveland Fed President, told CNBC: 'Both Kevin and Jay will be able to interact, and I think the rest of the FOMC will be able to interact, although I grant that it may be challenging.' The last partisan vote on a Fed nomination was Greenspan's 1994 reconfirmation — but the divide was narrower.

The shift touches American institutional coherence: the Fed becomes a political object, not a technical arbiter. The consequences are measured in credibility: US Treasuries are held by foreign creditors at roughly 30% (Japan, China, UK, sovereign funds). A monetary policy aligned with the presidential calendar reduces the stability premium these creditors accept. The Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan have begun discreetly calling for safeguards to protect central bank independence (predigest pass3, predictions). The scenario of a rapid Warsh rate cut — from 3.6% to 2.5% in 12 months — would re-ignite inflation and weaken the euro and yen against the dollar.